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Interpretation of cosmological data to determine the number and values of parameters describ-
ing the universe must not rely solely on statistics but involve physical insight. When statistical
techniques such as “model selection” or “integrated survey optimization” blindly apply Occam’s
Razor, this can lead to painful results. Sensitivity to prior probabilities and to the number of mod-
els compared can lead to “prior selection” rather than robust model selection. A concrete example
demonstrates that Information Criteria can in fact misinform over a large region of parameter space.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently several papers (e.g. [1, 2, 3], and references
therein) have claimed that fitting cosmological parame-
ters to data may be inadequate, if not misguided, as a
means of determining cosmology, in particular the nature
of dark energy accelerating the expansion of the universe.
They advocate interpreting the evidence for or against
a model in a manner intimately tied to the parameter
space volume: models with fewer parameters get boosted
in preference while models with more parameters – and
possibly better fits – should be penalized. This is all
in accord with statistical theory. In this approach one
should not fit parameters but rather select models; we
will refer to the various related techniques along these
lines generically as “model selection”.
However, this point of view can be taken too far,
and has as well some essential assumptions that pre-
vent model selection from being either a panacea or a
substitute for parameter fitting (which admittedly can
have pitfalls of its own). In general, statisticians want
to model data in an efficient way. That is, they want to
go from many data points to just a few parameters in a
model that captures the essence of the data accurately
and efficiently. Then, one can use that model to pre-
dict future outcomes, say (clinical trials, stock market,
climate change, etc.). However, physicists do not regard
the models as just useful summaries of the data, but as
fundamental descriptions of the data based on physical
principles. The parameters in our models have (or should
have) deep physical meanings, and are not just concise
ways of representing the data. Model efficiency takes a
back seat to physical fidelity.
We discuss drawbacks of the model selection paradigm
in §II, and give several historical examples in §III where
model selection would have led physicists astray, espe-
cially as a predictive mechanism. In §IV we present
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a complete numerical example, using simulated cosmo-
logical data, that shows how easily model selection can
lead us to the wrong physics. Inadequate data, or ex-
trapolation to future, better data, is particularly prob-
lematic within a model selection scenario since that re-
wards mathematical simplicity, which blurry data are
more likely to be consistent with. We emphasize in §V
that one can too easily misuse this paradigm in attempt-
ing survey design, judging data before it is taken.
This article does not oppose model selection as an ap-
proach, it just provides necessary highlights of areas of
caution such as sensitivity to the outer ranges – “cor-
ners” – of priors and unphysical dependence on number
of models being considered. Through a series of concrete
examples we illustrate why physics, not just statistics,
must retain a central role in interpreting data.
II. BAYESIAN APPROACH
An essential ingredient of the parameter fitting
paradigm is that the model described by the parame-
ter set is a reasonable choice. Model selectors ask what
if the model is faulty to begin with, and seek to avoid,
or at least dilute, this step by considering sets of models,
containing parameters, rather than sets of parameters.
As far as this goes, it is certainly reasonable – parameter
fitters must take care in choosing parameter sets, with
respect to validity and lack of bias. However, in parame-
ter fitting to data one already has built in tests to check
that the model is reasonable: 1) ideally one starts with
a physically motivated model, 2) if the goodness of fit
(e.g. chi-squared per degree of freedom) is poor then the
model receives careful scrutinization or is discarded, and
3) if subsets of data disagree then this may be a sign that
the parameter space should be expanded or abandoned.
So parameter fitting can check itself.
Model selection seeks to consider a space of models and
find the Bayesian evidence for each. Here the key ingre-
dient is the assigning of prior probabilities to parameter
states within each model. That is, in a not-insignificant
sense one must guess what the data are going to say
2before you have them. The final answer from model se-
lection depends on the prior assumptions, assumptions
often with relatively little physics guidance. Whether the
prior is uniform in a parameter itself or in a function of
the parameter has substantial impact on the results (for
one telling example concerning our very existence, see
[4]). The range of the prior is another crucial element.
Finally, while in parameter fitting one must ensure that
the particular parameter values of the fit are physical, in
model selection one must extend the probability analysis
throughout the entire range of parameter values, some
portions of which may be pathological without this be-
ing apparent (indeed the “corners” – the extreme ranges
of the prior – constitute 99.8% of the volume in a 10 di-
mensional space [5]). Only after these assumptions can
the model probability be computed.
The final quantity for selecting models is their evidence
value, the mean likelihood averaged over the prior. Since
probability must sum to unity, large parameter spaces,
or spaces where the prior extends widely, are strongly
penalized. Doesn’t this make sense, though? Shouldn’t
we apply Occam’s Razor to shave the models with more
“hair”? We agree that the consistency of data with a
model with few parameters can be a useful guide, but
there are several points that caution against overly strict
application of model selection: shaving blindly with Oc-
cam’s Razor is a dangerous activity.
For one thing, there is only one universe accessible
to us, so prior probability has a very limited meaning.
If only one point in the model parameter space fits the
data, nevertheless our universe may be described by that
model. Indeed, even the number of models being com-
pared influences the probabilities, as the Bayesian evi-
dence is calculated under the constraint that the total
probability must sum to unity.
For another, any model that somewhere fits the data
must be allowed to live or else we sacrifice the good with
the bad. If there is one “fit” fruit on a tree with bad
apples, using model selection criteria everything would
be thrown away without exception.
The role of the prior for model selection is crucial, yet
the method of selection of the prior is completely un-
defined. Consider the equation of state phase space w-
w′, where w is the equation of state ratio of the dark
energy pressure to energy density, and w′ = dw/d ln a.
Should we choose a prior distribution uniform in w and
w′, or perhaps uniform in w and w˙ = Hw′ – the Bayesian
evidence will be different in the two cases and models
may be ruled out in one case but not the other. Or
should we choose a uniform prior in the field values φ
and φ˙? Perhaps φ˙2 and V , where V is the potential en-
ergy and φ˙2/2 the kinetic energy? Perhaps V and V ′,
where V ′ = dV/dφ? What model selection tells us is
an acceptable cosmology differs in each case. The foun-
dation, the priors, are essentially undefined by physics
but put in by the model selectors by hand. Indeed it is
tempting to call this approach “prior selection” rather
than model selection. Many of these issues are indeed
recognized in the statistics community (see, e.g., [6]), if
not with full emphasis on physical fidelity.
Mathematical simplicity – the essential weighting for
model selection – does not necessarily accord with phys-
ical simplicity. We do not always recognize simplicity
when we see it. Consider the model spanned by the coef-
ficients of a polynomial function f(x) = a0+a1x+a2x
2+
. . . Model selection will deal harshly with it, despite that
the apparent complexity – in some cases an infinite num-
ber of parameters – sometimes represents simplicity, such
as f(x) = ex, with zero parameters. Conversely, mod-
els which appear simple can hide deeper complexity, e.g.
where a Gaussian is actually approximating the convolu-
tion of multiple functions.
Braneworld models in a spatially flat universe are ex-
tremely simple, involving one parameter, the crossover
distance. However if we do model selection in terms
of the distance-redshift relation d(z), or the equation
of state ratio w(z), it appears the braneworld models
have many more parameters than the cosmological con-
stant model. Model selection will penalize strongly the
braneworld model for the apparent number of parame-
ters, despite the underlying physics being quite simple.
As another example, a constant equation of state model
would appear to have many parameters if discussed in
terms of redshift-binned densities ρ(zi) or principal com-
ponents of the density (also see [7]). Thus the concept of
simplicity is actually quite complicated. We discuss this
further in §III, giving historical examples.
Parameter fitting allows us to compare cosmologies
equally in the space describing cosmological distances,
or densities, or equation of state, or somewhat “non-
parametric” forms like principal components. Model se-
lection imposes an unphysical overlayer of expectation on
such comparisons, based on a perceived simplicity.
Parameter fitting does not require prior knowledge of
the probability weighting within the parameter space; it
allows the physics to, literally, impose “survival of the
fittest”. The most useful parameterizations are more-
over motivated physically. Consider the equation of state
phase space w-w′. While model selection would weight
this as a whole, as two parameters, physics calls out cer-
tain subregions of this space as being especially phys-
ically relevant [8]. In particular, thawing dark energy
cosmologies, where the dark energy was locked by Hub-
ble expansion drag in a cosmological constant like state
in the early universe and more recently released to evolve,
follow one-dimensional trajectories in a narrow region, or
inverse power law models actually possess only a single
equation of state parameter, not two. Model selection
deweights these solutions because – although they may
be perfectly good fits – they reside in a larger param-
eter space. Conversely, model selection favors constant
equation of state models, with a single parameter, de-
spite their being physically unstable, requiring a precise
fine tuning of the ratio between kinetic and potential en-
ergies.
3III. REALITY CHECK
Prior to 1998, supernova distance data were consistent
with a flat, matter dominated universe. Model selection
would have claimed strong evidence for the zero parame-
ter SCDM (Ωm = 1) model, disfavored the general mat-
ter dominated universe OCDM (Ωm ∈ [0, 2], say), and
dismissed a cosmological constant universe ΛCDM (Ωm
+ Λ). Simplicity does not automatically bring truth.
Feynman famously pointed up the pitfall in calling on
simplicity as a guidepost in physics by rewriting all of
physics as ~U = 0, where each element of ~U contained
the hidden structure, e.g. Newton’s second law as U1 =
F −ma.
Before 1992 the Bayesian evidence was overwhelming
against structure in the cosmic microwave background,
i.e. comparing the model parametrized by the temper-
ature power spectrum multipoles Cℓ = 0 vs. the much
larger parameter space spanned by C2, C3, etc. But no
one would have taken such an argument seriously. (Of
course using individual Cℓ is a statistical approach not a
physical one, but that is part of the point about needing
physical input.)
The galaxy two-point spatial correlation function for
many years was thought to be a power law, with only
two parameters, yet now we know there is little physics
in that model; rather the apparent power law is nearly a
coincidence from evolution in the true matter clustering
and in the bias between mass and light.
The mass power spectrum looks like a smooth curve
yet we appreciate the deeper physics only by going to an
apparently more complicated halo model involving the
addition of multiple terms.
In a particle physics context, the Fermi theory of
weak interactions managed to describe all low-energy
phenomenology with one single parameter, the Fermi
constant GF . However, the underlying renormalizable
physical theory, the Glashow-Weinberg-Salam Standard
Model of electroweak interactions, has many more free
parameters, and has also a realm of application much
wider than that of the Fermi theory, which came to be
regarded as just a low-energy effective theory.
These historical examples are clearest for information
criteria approximations to the full Bayesian evidence, but
such simplicity or “predictiveness” arguments apply to
the evidence as well. While the full evidence factorizes
out unconstrained parameters, these parameters may not
be recognized, e.g. when an equation of state parameter
is viewed in density or distance (see §II), and in any case
the mere presence of more models affects the evidence.
Purely statistical ideas of simplicity are insufficient in
physics. To a large extent, beauty follows truth, not
truth beauty. What we consider simple is what we un-
derstand. A mess of spectral lines from a hydrogen atom
is ugly until we understand the physics behind it, then we
realize it is beautiful and simple. The simple cosmologi-
cal constant hides, within present physics knowledge, all
sorts of ugly fine tunings, while a complicated equation
of state w(z) may turn into something as beautiful as the
hydrogen atom. Model selection forces us to give undue
weight to our guess as to which is an ugly duckling and
which will be a beautiful swan.
IV. A WORKED-OUT EXAMPLE
As a specific example of the overemphasis that model
selection places on models with fewer parameters, despite
the physics, we analyze constraints on dark energy from
future data. For such data we take a distance-redshift
survey over redshifts z = 0.1 − 1.7, similar to the su-
pernova half of the proposed SNAP satellite mission [9],
supplemented by 300 local Hubble flow (z = 0.03− 0.08)
supernovae as will be provided from the Nearby Super-
nova Factory (SNF) survey [10], and by measurement of
the distance to the surface of CMB last scattering pro-
vided by the ESA-NASA mission Planck [11].
The supernovae (SNe) numbers and redshift distribu-
tion are as given in [12]. We include a linearly rising
systematic error floor in each ∆z = 0.1 redshift bin of
σsyst = 0.02z/1.7, to be added in quadrature in each red-
shift bin to the measurement error given by σint/
√
NSN,
with σint = 0.12 and NSN being the number of Type Ia
SNe in that bin. We take a relative precision of 0.7% in
the Planck distance measurement.
A standard cosmological fit analysis of actual SNAP
+ SNF + Planck data will produce a central value in
the (w0,wa) plane (recall that wa = −2w′(z = 1)) and a
contour around it encompassing some chosen confidence
level (CL), typically 68, 90, or 95%. The point corre-
sponding to a cosmological constant (-1,0) may or may
not lie inside the contour. If it does not, we may say that
we exclude ΛCDM at that CL.
More precisely, in a frequentist analysis in which one
aims to prove or disprove ΛCDM, one would simulate
the expected SNAP + SNF + Planck data sample as-
suming a ΛCDM universe, and, analyzing this synthetic
data sample as if it were the real data, one would draw a,
say, 90% CL contour around the (-1,0) point, much like
the one depicted as the inner contour in Fig. 1. (Note no
assumption of Gaussianity in likelihoods has been made.)
That contour tells us that, if ΛCDM is true, we expect to
get a central value inside that contour in 90% of the ob-
servations like SNAP + SNF + Planck that we may per-
form. Therefore, if our one real SNAP + SNF + Planck
observation delivers a central value outside that contour,
irrespectively of its associated error ellipse, we will be
able to say that we have excluded ΛCDM at greater than
90% CL. For all true models defined by (w0,wa) values
outside that contour, we expect (in the statistical sense)
the measured values to lie, indeed, outside, and so we
expect to be able to select them over ΛCDM at greater
than 90% CL.
With the information criteria approach used by model
selection advocates, one penalizes models with more pa-
rameters. Various information criteria exist (see [3] for
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FIG. 1: Confidence-level contours for a SNAP(SNe) + SNF
+ Planck combined data sample. The cosmological models
defined by (w0,wa) lying outside the inner contour would be
favored over ΛCDM at more than 90% CL by a standard
fitting analysis. The models lying inside the outer contour
would be strongly rejected by a BIC analysis. The shaded
area in between the contours corresponds to the loci of models
that, if realized in nature, would be preferred at over 90% CL
by fitting, but strongly, and wrongly, rejected by BIC.
an overview); here we concentrate on the Bayesian In-
formation Criterion (BIC), which is closely related to
the Bayesian evidence but frequently used because it
is simpler to compute. The outer contour in Fig. 1
shows the formal BIC contour corresponding to ∆BIC ≡
BIC(w0, wa) − BIC(ΛCDM) = 6. Values of ∆BIC ≥ 6
indicate strong evidence against the model being probed.
That is, for all models defined by (w0,wa) inside the
outer contour of Fig. 1, BIC would give strong evidence
against them and strong evidence supporting, instead,
ΛCDM. (In contrast, the iso-contour in likelihood L with
−2∆ lnL = 9.48 (not shown), which, with the penalty
from (w0, wa) models having two additional parameters
beyond ΛCDM, roughly corresponds in our problem to
∆BIC = 6, yields a 99.13% CL against ΛCDM in the
fitting analysis.)
For this combined data sample, one can say that a
Bayesian Information Criterion analysis misinforms us
about, i.e. spuriously rules out, all models inside the
dashed contour. In order for BIC to give the same
hint against ΛCDM that the standard fitting analysis
gives at 90% CL, one has to go in this case to a con-
tour with ∆BIC = −2 (or roughly −2∆ lnL = 17.48),
which would extend to the margins of the figure. Note
−2∆ lnL = 17.48 corresponds to 99.98% CL in the fitting
analysis. That is, only when the fitting analysis gives Λ
less than a 2× 10−4 chance of being correct, does model
selection start to give a weak hint of preference for the
(w0, wa) model, turning away from the incorrect model
ΛCDM.
For all models whose (w0,wa) lies between the two
contours in Fig. 1 the standard fitting analysis would
guide us away from ΛCDM, while the BIC analysis would
strongly, and wrongly, discard the true – by construction
– model. Such are the dangers of model selection based
on simplicity arguments. Indeed the area of the BIC
“misinformation” region is larger than the entire region
where Λ is viable according to standard fitting. Fig. 1
also shows the physically motivated freezing and thaw-
ing regions [8] where models should generically lie. We
see that BIC is particularly slanted against the half of
the physical space that is thawing models.
V. PREDICTION AND SURVEY DESIGN
As shown from the historical examples in §III, model
selection is unsuitable for predicting constraints from fu-
ture data and surveys. Physics input, not statistical
probability, is required for assessing the value of future
surveys.
Claims for survey optimization that average likelihoods
over prior probabilities are basically betting on absence
of any physical structure. A similar assumption was ad-
dressed in [13] where it was shown that a figure of merit
based solely on the area of the confidence region was ro-
bust only on abdication of physics input. Such a “blank
map” approach was there called Snarkian statistics, af-
ter Lewis Carroll’s poem, “The Hunting of the Snark”.
Using model selection to design surveys or plan for the
future based on present consistency with the cosmologi-
cal constant is similarly like saying the snark hunters are
well served by a “map representing the sea without the
least vestige of land” because the sea so far has been fea-
tureless: it may be simple and favored in model selection,
but is not to be trusted for navigating if reefs and islands
– structure – may exist.
Standard parameter fitting methods should and can
test if the model framework is reasonable or not, as men-
tioned in §II. In particular, the cosmological w0-wa pa-
rameterization was specifically invented from the physi-
cal motivation of scalar field behavior [14] and has been
carefully shown to be largely safe from bias [13]. Good-
ness of fit alerts us to problems in the parameterization,
informs us if we should enlarge the parameter space (e.g.
by comparison of the results of data subsets or multi-
ple probes – a very important aspect of learning about
dark energy physics), and allows comparison of disjoint
models that do not share a parameter space. We do not
need to know a priori the probabilities at every point in
parameter space; the data lead us.
5VI. CONCLUSIONS
When coupled with strong physical inputs, tests of ro-
bustness against priors, and precise data, model selection
techniques can be a useful companion to the standard
parameter fitting approach. They are not, however, a
panacea or a way to draw conclusions stronger than ac-
tual data can support. We cannot get answers about the
physics before we get the data. The sensitivity to prior
guesses about the probability of the correct physics runs
the risk of turning this approach into “prior selection”
rather than model selection.
Overenthusiastic application of model selection has led
to some claims about the probability of future experi-
ments failing to see characteristics such as dynamics that
current data cannot access. Such statistical pronounce-
ments from the shaky foundation of priors are reminis-
cent of the Dao De Qing, which lessons us that “Without
going outside, you may know the whole world, without
looking through the window, you may see the ways of
heaven. The farther you go, the less you know.” Though
a larger parameter space – representing “farther” physics
– has many points that fail to fit, only one point needs
to be correct, and that large parameter space may arise
from a simple, beautiful theory once we understand it.
As the eminent statistician C.R. Rao puts it, “The [in-
formation] criteria do not take into account the purpose
for which the model is estimated and the loss incurred in
using the estimated distribution to predict future events”
[15].
Parameters should have physical meanings, and statis-
ticians’ model efficiency then takes a back seat to physical
fidelity. Through a concrete example we showed how a
statistical Information Criterion can decisively rule out
a physical model – incorrectly. Furthermore, the mis-
information area of model selection exhibited in Fig. 1
grows even larger with more parameters. Recalling our
Standard Model analogy of §III, we should have no ex-
pectation that the physics of 75% of the universe’s energy
density can be explained by a single number.
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